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THE AFFORDABLE CLEAN ENERGY RULE AND THE 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
REGULATION OF THE U.S. POWER INDUSTRY 
David Zilberberg* 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 31, 2018, the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) published a proposed rule to replace the 2015 
Obama-era Clean Power Plan1 (“CPP”) with the Affordable Clean 
Energy Rule2 (the “ACE Rule”). While both rules are designed to 
regulate the greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions from fossil fuel-fired 
power plants pursuant to EPA’s authority under Section 111(d) of the 
Clean Air Act3 (“CAA”), they are dramatically different in scope and 
ambition: whereas the CPP proposed to limit GHG emissions by 
mandating fundamental shifts in the way the nation generates 
electricity, the ACE Rule is limited to measures aimed at improving 
                                                                 
* Mr. Zilberberg is counsel in the Corporate Department at Davis Polk & Wardwell 
LLP, practicing in the Environmental Group. He advises clients with respect to 
environmental, sustainability and mass tort liability issues in connection with all 
aspects of complex corporate and real estate transactions. 
 
This article is based in part on a Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP memorandum by David 
Zilberberg, Loyti Cheng, Betty Moy Huber, and Michael Comstock entitled EPA’s 
New Greenhouse Gas Emissions Rule for U.S. Power Sector – Legal Considerations 
and Business Impacts (available at: https://www.davispolk.com/publications/epa%
E2%80%99s-new-greenhouse-gas-emissions-rule-us-power-sector-%E2%80%93-
legal-considerations-and) [https://perma.cc/XPK5-R38J]. 
 1. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,697 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 2. Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric 
Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing 
Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746 
(proposed Aug. 31, 2018) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 60). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012). 
2018] THE AFFORDABLE CLEAN ENERGY RULE 105 
 
the efficiency and prolonging the lifespan of coal-fired power plants. 
EPA is currently considering the numerous comments submitted on 
the proposed rule during the sixty-day comment period that ended on 
October 31, 2018 and reportedly intends to finalize the rule by March 
2019.4 
This Article provides an overview of the CPP and ACE Rule, 
including a discussion of their history and key provisions, as well as a 
consideration of the possible future trajectory of federal climate 
change regulation of the power sector. Section I discusses the history 
of climate change regulation of power plants leading up to the 
publication of the CPP. Section II discusses the key provisions of the 
CPP and the legal challenges that led to a stay of the CPP. Section III 
provides an overview of the ACE Rule and the key legal considerations 
it raises. Section IV discusses the key legal issues likely to be 
addressed in future lawsuits challenging the ACE Rule. Finally, 
Section V discusses the implications of the ACE Rule for the 
environment and industry as well as the possible directions of climate 
change regulation of the power sector in the future. 
I. THE ROAD TO REGULATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION OF 
POWER PLANTS 
A. The 2006 new source performance standards for power plants 
The CPP and the ACE Rule have their roots in the decades-long 
efforts by states and environmental groups to compel EPA to regulate 
GHG emissions under the CAA that began in the late 1990s. In the 
mid-2000s, EPA began developing revised air emissions standards, 
known as “new source performance standards,” or NSPS, which are 
essentially emissions targets for power plants under Section 111(b) of 
the CAA. Section 111(b) of the CAA requires EPA to list categories 
of stationary sources that cause or contribute significantly to air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health and to issue NSPS for new or modified sources of emissions in 
such categories based on what EPA determines to be the “best system 
of emissions reduction,” or BSER. A group of states and organizations 
                                                                 
 4. Abby Smith, Power Rule Repeal, Replacement Headed for Finish Line Early 
2019, BLOOMBERG LAW (October 17, 2018), https://www.bna.com/power-rule-
repeal-n73014483402/ [https://perma.cc/EH2B-FSSH]. 
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supporting climate change regulation urged EPA to include NSPS for 
GHGs (such as CO2) in its power plant rules. However, the final rule, 
issued in 2006 (the “2006 Power Plant NSPS”), concluded that EPA 
did not have the legal authority under the CAA to regulate climate 
change.5 The states and organizations sued.6 
B. The political and legal tides turn 
In the meantime, two important developments occurred. First, in 
2007, the United States Supreme Court decided Massachusetts v. 
EPA,7 which opened the door to EPA regulation of GHG emissions 
under the CAA by ruling that GHGs constitute “air pollutants” under 
Section 202(a) of the CAA, which relates to emissions from motor 
vehicles. The Supreme Court determined that under the CAA, EPA 
was required to regulate GHG emissions from vehicles if EPA 
determined that such emissions endanger the public health or welfare. 
Second, in 2008, Barack Obama was elected President on a platform 
that advocated regulation of climate change. In 2009, following the 
dictates of Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA issued a finding that GHGs 
in the atmosphere from vehicle emissions are likely to endanger the 
public health and welfare (the “Endangerment Finding”), thereby 
triggering a requirement to regulate GHG emissions from vehicles.8 
Against this backdrop, in 2010, EPA decided to settle the legal 
challenge to the 2006 Power Plant NSPS by agreeing to issue NSPS 
for GHG emissions from new and modified fossil fuel-fired power 
plants under Section 111(b) of the CAA.9  EPA also agreed to 
formulate emissions guidelines for GHG emissions from existing fossil 
fuel-fired power plants under Section 111(d), a provision of the CAA 
which requires EPA to develop BSER for existing sources that are the 
subject of NSPS under Section 111(b). This second step put an 
                                                                 
 5. Standards of Performance for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 
Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, and Small Industrial- 
Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 71 Fed. Reg. 9,866, 9,869 (Feb. 
27, 2006) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 6. See New York v. EPA, No. 06–1322 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 24, 2007). 
 7. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 8. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
 9. Proposed Settlement Agreement, Clean Air Act Citizen Suit, 75 Fed. Reg. 
82,392 (Dec. 30, 2010). 
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exceedingly challenging problem on EPA’s agenda: how to regulate 
GHG emissions from the nation’s enormous and varied fleet of fossil 
fuel-fired power plants whose very design requires the combustion of 
carbon-based fuels? 
II. THE CPP 
A. Overview of the CPP 
In August 2015, EPA issued both the CPP as well as NSPS for new 
fossil fuel-fired power plants (the “2015 Power Plant NSPS”).10  At 
that point, the Obama Administration, having failed to shepherd 
climate change legislation through Congress, considered the CPP to be 
a central element of its Climate Action Plan, which pulled together all 
of the administration’s climate change initiatives into a single strategy 
document. According to EPA, the CPP would reduce CO2 emissions 
from the power sector by thirty-two percent by 2030 relative to 2005 
emissions.11 
The CPP employed a novel approach to using Section 111(d) of the 
CAA to regulate GHG emissions from the power sector. Under Section 
111(d), EPA is required to determine BSER in establishing emissions 
guidelines for existing sources in a regulated category, which the states 
are to use as the basis of a plan (subject to EPA approval) that 
establishes standards of performance for the emissions. Under the 
CPP, EPA determined that BSER for CO2 emissions from the fossil 
fuel-fired power sector consisted of three measures, or “building 
blocks,” that in combination would reduce emissions to meet the 
CPP’s targets. These building blocks included the following: 
1. Improving the “heat rate” of coal-fired power plants (i.e., 
lowering the amount of fuel combusted per unit of energy), 
                                                                 
 10. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, 
Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 
80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, and 
98). These standards require that new coal-fired power plants include carbon capture 
and sequestration (“CCS”), a new, expensive technology that has had limited 
commercial implementation, and that new natural gas-fired power plants include 
natural gas combined cycle (“NGCC”) technology. See id. at 64513-64515. 
 11. See FACT SHEET: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, EPA https://archive.
epa.gov/epa/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan.html [https://
perma.cc/J6G7-ANZN] (last visited Dec. 9, 2018). 
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2. Shifting electricity generation from coal-fired power plants to 
lower emitting existing natural gas combined cycle plants, and 
3. Shifting electricity generation from fossil fuel-fired power 
plants to new wind, solar and other renewable sources. 
Notably, while the first building block entails emissions reduction 
measures that an individual power plant could implement (i.e., 
efficiency improvements), the second and third building blocks 
envision the shifting of electricity generation from one category of 
power plants (i.e., coal-fired plants) to other categories (i.e., natural 
gas combined cycle plants and renewables). Those latter measures 
effectively call for limiting the operation of an individual power plant 
(or shutting it down outright) and running another one instead, which 
can only be implemented on an industry-wide basis as a practical 
matter. EPA’s decision to designate such “beyond the fence line” 
measures as BSER under Section 111(d) would be the basis of one of 
the key legal objections to the CPP identified by CPP opponents as 
discussed further below. 
EPA then established interim and final CO2 emission performance 
rates for two categories of power plants by applying these building 
blocks to the nation’s fleet of power plants: (i) fossil fuel-fired steam 
generating units (generally coal- and oil-fired power plants); and (ii) 
natural gas combined cycle, or NGCC, units. The CPP translated these 
rates as three alternative standards, each of which were designed to 
achieve equivalent emissions reductions: as statewide rate-based 
emissions reduction targets (i.e., reductions in pounds of CO2 emitted 
per megawatt of electricity generated), state-wide mass-based 
emissions reduction targets (i.e., reductions in the aggregate short tons 
of CO2 emitted) or emissions performance targets applicable to 
individual power plants. States were given the option of choosing any 
of these targets. 
In accordance with Section 111(d), the CPP required states to 
prepare and submit state implementation plans (“SIPs”) to EPA for 
approval, describing how they intended to comply with the targets. 
States were given flexibility to develop their own strategies to meet the 
targets or use the building blocks identified by EPA. In addition, the 
CPP permitted states to participate in regional initiatives to meet the 
emissions targets, such as state or regional CO2 emissions credit 
trading systems. Regulated sources were required to begin meeting 
interim targets by 2022 and to meet the final targets by 2030. 
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EPA also released a proposed federal implementation plan (“FIP”) 
for states that failed to prepare a SIP that complied with the CPP’s 
standards. The FIP consisted of emission caps directly applicable to 
regulated power plants, along with a trading system that allowed a 
power plant with GHG emissions above the cap to purchase credits 
from other participants. The FIP was also presented as a model for 
states to follow in designing their own SIPs. 
The CPP also included a proposed incentive program rewarding 
states that develop wind or solar prior to the 2022 initial compliance 
date. States would have received emissions allowances based on the 
amount of electricity generated by wind or solar projects that meet the 
requirements of the program, which in turn were to be used as a credit 
against their CO2 emissions. 
B. Legal challenges to the CPP 
i. The D.C. Circuit petition 
The day it was published in the Federal Register, over two dozen 
states and many industry groups, energy companies, utilities and 
public policy organizations filed petitions challenging the CPP in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
(the “D.C. Circuit”).12  The petitioners were opposed by EPA as well 
as a comparably large number of states and other parties. While the 
thousands of pages of briefing addressed a myriad array of arguments, 
some general and some applicable to specific elements of the rule or 
individual parties, highlighted below are several of the central legal 
issues addressed in the litigation. 
                                                                 
 12. Many of the petitions challenging the Clean Power Plan have been 
consolidated into one case: West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. docketed 
Oct. 23, 2015). Access to the docket is available through Public Access to Court 
Electronic Records (PACER), as well as the Climate Change Litigation Database, 
established by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law of Columbia University in 
collaboration with Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP. West Virginia v. EPA, 
CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION DATABASE, http://climatecasechart.com/case/west-
virginia-v-epa/ [https://perma.cc/JD8P-GCN6] (last visited Dec. 9, 2018); see also 
LINDA TSANG, & ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700 CLEAN 
POWER PLAN: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND PENDING LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA V. 
EPA 1 n.3 (2017). 
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a. Chevron deference 
Although agency interpretation of federal statutes is normally 
entitled to deference under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,13 petitioners argued that given the broad jurisdiction 
being asserted by the EPA, the significance of the economic and 
political impact of the CPP and the lack of clear congressional 
authorization of such a rule, deference to EPA interpretation is not 
called for. The respondents contended that the CPP falls squarely 
within EPA’s authority to interpret the CAA and that Chevron is 
regularly applied to EPA regulations that are of comparable 
significance. 
b. “Beyond the fence line” emissions reduction measures under 
Section 111 of the CAA 
As noted above, under the CPP, EPA determined that BSER for 
existing fossil fuel-fired power plants includes “building blocks” that 
call for shifting electricity generation from coal to other types of 
energy sources, i.e., “beyond the fence line.”  Petitioners argued that 
the text and statutory context of Section 111(d) limit its scope to 
measures that can be implemented at a particular source. The 
respondents argued that the term “system” in the phrase “best system 
of emissions reductions” is intentionally broad to provide EPA with 
the flexibility to develop a range of methods to reduce emissions, 
including measures calling for shifting generation from a higher 
polluting source to a lower polluting source. 
c. The impact of Section 112 of the CAA on the scope of Section 111 
of the CAA 
Due to an odd legislative glitch, the correct text of Section 111 of 
the CAA is subject to uncertainty due to the fact that the House and 
Senate versions of the 1990 amendments to the CAA were never 
reconciled. Petitioners argued that the House version of Section 111(d) 
(which they contend is the correct one) denies EPA the authority to 
regulate CO2 emissions from existing power plants because it provides 
that source categories regulated under Section 112 of the CAA (which 
governs hazardous air pollutants) cannot be regulated under Section 
                                                                 
 13. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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111(d).14  Because power plants are already subject to regulation under 
Section 112, power plants are exempt from regulation under Section 
111(d). The respondents argued that the Senate version provides that 
pollutants regulated under Section 112 cannot be regulated under 
Section 111(d). Given that CO2 emissions have not been the subject 
of Section 112 regulation, 111(d) does not preclude the regulation of 
CO2 emissions from existing power plants.15 
Notwithstanding the thousands of pages of legal briefing, the CPP 
will most likely never be addressed by the federal courts nor go into 
effect due to a series of remarkable legal and political developments 
that followed. 
ii. The Supreme Court stays the CPP 
Many of the petitioners asked the D.C. Circuit to stay the CPP while 
their challenge was pending. In January 2016, a panel of the D.C. 
Circuit denied the stay on the basis that the “[p]etitioners have not 
satisfied the stringent requirements for a stay pending court review.”16  
Petitioners then appealed the decision to the United States Supreme 
Court, which in a 5–4 decision reversed the D.C. Circuit and stayed 
the CPP until a decision on the merits is reached.17  Some observers 
noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had never before overruled a 
decision by a lower court to deny staying a final agency rule.18 
III. THE 2016 ELECTION AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION’S REVERSAL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION 
A. The Trump Administration’s pro-fossil fuel agenda 
The election of Donald J. Trump as President in 2016 presaged a 
dramatic shift in the federal government’s approach to climate change 
regulation. As a candidate, Trump advocated an economic platform 
focused on boosting domestic fossil fuel-based industries, including 
                                                                 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(A)(i). The House version of the amendment was 
passed as Pub. L. No. 101–549, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2574 (1990) and is reflected 
in the version published in the United States Code. 
 15. See Pub. L. No. 101–549, § 108(g), 104 Stat. 2399, 2467 (1990). 
 16. West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2016). 
 17. See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (Feb. 9, 2016). 
 18. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLEAN POWER PLAN, supra note 12, at 18 n.127. 
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coal, oil, and natural gas. A central plank in his platform was a pledge 
to roll back President Obama’s climate change agenda. 
Shortly after his inauguration, in March 2017 President Trump 
signed a sweeping executive order aimed at reversing signature 
portions of the Obama Administration’s key climate change 
initiatives.19  Framed as a series of measures to bolster American 
energy independence, economic growth, and job creation, the 
executive order pledged to undo nearly two dozen Obama-era 
regulations, executive actions, policies, and guidance documents, 
among them the CPP as well as the 2015 Power Plant NSPS.20 
In light of its plan to repeal the CPP, EPA and the other petitioners 
challenging it convinced the D.C. Circuit to hold the litigation in 
abeyance as the rulemaking process played out. With the CPP stayed, 
and the litigation challenging it indefinitely on hold, there was 
effectively no meaningful chance that the CPP would ever go into 
effect. 
In the wake of the order, EPA faced a number of options on how to 
proceed with respect to the CPP as well as other climate change rules 
targeted by the order, including the 2015 Power Plant NSPS. Would it 
reverse the Endangerment Finding and adopt the position taken by the 
Bush administration that EPA has no authority to regulate climate 
change and simply repeal the CPP as well as the NSPS?  Given the 
factual record compiled by the EPA in support of the Endangerment 
Finding, reversing it would seem to be an uphill battle. Would it repeal 
the CPP only and adopt the position of the petitioners in the CPP 
litigation that the House version of Section 111(d) precludes regulation 
of CO2 from existing power plants?  Courts may question EPA’s 
“about face” (as EPA previously interpreted the CAA in precisely the 
opposite manner in promulgating the CPP) or simply reject this 
reading of the CAA as unreasonable. Or would it replace the CPP with 
a more modest version? 
                                                                 
 19. Exec. Order No. 13783, 3 C.F.R. 312 (2017). 
 20. Id. 
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B. The CPP repeal proposal 
EPA foreshadowed its approach in its proposal to repeal the CPP 
published in a Federal Register notice in late 2017.21  In the notice, 
EPA explained that it now believed that under Section 111 of the CAA, 
BSER is limited to measures “that can be applied to or at the source 
and not something that the source’s owner or operator can implement 
on behalf of the source at another location.”22  Accordingly, “beyond 
the fence line” measures such as those set forth in the CPP should not 
constitute BSER. EPA made a number of arguments in support of its 
position. First, EPA asserted, the key statutory phrases of Section 111, 
and in particular the phrase “establishes standards of performance for 
any existing source” suggests measures that can be implemented at the 
source of emissions.23  Second, EPA asserted that this interpretation of 
BSER is supported by Section 111’s legislative history, EPA’s own 
prior interpretations of Section 111, and other provisions of the CAA.24  
Finally, EPA asserted that its interpretation of BSER avoids involving 
EPA in energy policy, which is the primarily the responsibility of 
FERC and the states.25 
The implication of the repeal proposal was clear: EPA did not intend 
to revisit its authority to regulate climate change by reconsidering the 
Endangerment Finding or assert that it could not regulate GHG 
emissions from existing power plants due to the existence of 
regulations of the source category under Section 112. Instead, EPA 
planned on regulating existing power plants but limiting BSER to 
“within the fence line” measures. 
                                                                 
 21. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (Oct. 16, 2017) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). 
 22. Id. at 48,039. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 48,040-48,042. 
 25. Id. at 48,042. 
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C. The ACE Rule 
1. BSER under the ACE Rule 
EPA published the ACE Rule on August 31, 2018.26  As telegraphed 
in the CPP repeal proposal, the ACE Rule departs from the CPP by 
proposing to achieve GHG emissions reductions by establishing 
exclusively “within the fence line” measures for individual power 
plants. It does this by establishing BSER based on source-specific heat 
rate improvements (“HRIs”) to be implemented at coal–fired power 
plants. The ACE Rule identifies a number of “candidate technologies,” 
including various smart technologies and improved maintenance 
practices.27 EPA believes these are the most effective HRI measures, 
meaning they are most likely to reduce the energy used to generate 
electricity, and describes the amount of emissions reductions it 
believes is achievable for each. 
2. Obligations of states 
Beyond identifying technologies as BSER and providing 
information regarding these technologies, including the emissions 
reductions they would achieve, the ACE Rule does not establish actual 
concrete reduction targets or guidelines. Unlike the CPP, which set 
state-wide GHG emissions targets, responsibility for establishing 
targets would be delegated to states. States would be required to submit 
plans that establish “standards of performance” for each emissions 
source (i.e., power plant subject to the rule) in its jurisdiction 
(expressed as pounds of CO2 per MWh rate), which will be evaluated 
                                                                 
 26. On December 6, 2018, EPA also issued a proposed rule replacing the 2015 
Power Plant NSPS applicable to new, modified and reconstructed coal-fired power 
plants. Most significantly, the published rule would replace the 2015 Power Plant 
NSPS requirement that twenty new coal power plants employ carbon capture and 
sequestration. The 2015 Power Plant NSPS applicable to new, modified and 
reconstructed natural gas-fired power plants remain unchanged. See Review of 
Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and 
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 83 Fed. Reg. 
65,424 (Dec. 20, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 27. Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric 
Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing 
Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746, 
44,759 (Aug. 31, 2018) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 60). 
2018] THE AFFORDABLE CLEAN ENERGY RULE 115 
 
by EPA.28 However, unlike the CPP, the criteria for evaluation focus 
entirely on process: the plans have to demonstrate that the state 
considered each of the HRI technologies designated by EPA for each 
emissions source in establishing the standards and that the standards 
are “quantifiable, verifiable, non-duplicative, permanent, and 
enforceable.”29 The criteria do not impose any substantive benchmarks 
or targets, and the ACE Rule explicitly notes that states will be granted 
considerable flexibility in both establishing and implementing 
standards.30 According to EPA, this approach, in contrast with the 
approach taken in the CPP, is more in line with Section 111(d)’s text, 
which EPA asserts reflects a “spirit of cooperative federalism.”31 
3. Scope 
The ACE Rule is narrower in scope than the CPP in other important 
respects. The ACE Rule would be applicable only to fossil fuel–fired 
electric utility steam generating units, which generally consist of coal–
fired power plants, and explicitly carves out, among other emitters, 
municipal waste combustor units, commercial or industrial solid waste 
incineration units and integrated gasification combined cycle units.32 
EPA also notes in the ACE Rule that it does not have sufficient 
information to develop a BSER for natural gas–fired simple-cycle 
turbines or combined cycle turbines.33 As a result, those turbines are 
currently not covered by the ACE Rule, although EPA is soliciting 
comments as to whether the proposed scope of the ACE Rule is 
appropriate. 
4. Changes to the New Source Review program 
Unlike the CPP, the ACE Rule also proposes changes to the New 
Source Review program (“NSR”), which imposes preconstruction 
permitting and pollution control requirements on “major 
                                                                 
 28. Id. at 44,808-09. 
 29. Id. at 44,809. 
 30. Id. at 44,765 
 31. Id. The ACE Rule also includes revised implementation regulations for future 
rulemaking under Section 111(d) that reflect the rule’s approach to establishing 
standards of performance for CO2 emissions from power plants. Id. at 44765. 
 32. Id. at 44,810. 
 33. Id. at 44,755. 
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modifications” to existing industrial facilities, including power plants. 
Under current regulations, NSR is triggered when a facility’s overall 
emissions increase above a certain amount. Under the changes 
proposed by the ACE Rule, NSR would be triggered when a power 
plant subject to the rule increases its hourly emissions rate above a 
certain amount.34  This means that increases to overall emissions 
would not trigger a potentially expensive NSR review unless they also 
involve an increase to the hourly emissions rate. While the purpose of 
this change is to lower the likelihood that modifications made by 
power plants to comply with the ACE Rule engage NSR review, the 
modification to the NSR regulations would apply to all power plants 
subject to the NSR regulations, not just coal-fired EGUs, and would 
apply to all regulated pollutants, not just GHGs. This proposal, which 
has no counterpart in the CPP, is a reflection of the stark difference of 
philosophy between the two rules: while the CPP envisioned a gradual 
phase out of coal–fired power plants over time, the ACE Rule seeks to 
maintain coal–fired power plants while making them more efficient. 
5. Timelines 
The proposed timelines under the ACE Rule will mean that 
regulatory uncertainty with respect to regulation of GHG emissions 
from power plants will continue at least for the near future. The ACE 
Rule gives states three years from date of publication of the final rule 
to submit their standards of performance to EPA.35  EPA then has a 
year to evaluate each state’s standards, and if a proposed standard does 
not meet EPA’s criteria or if a state fails to submit a standard, EPA has 
an additional two-year period to put into place a federal plan.36 
Additionally, the ACE Rule does not provide any timing requirements 
for the implementation of the states’ standards of performance. The 
potential six-year wait for implementation of the ACE Rule, if 
finalized, may mean, however, that a future administration and 
Congress could enact alternative GHG legislation or regulations or 
generally adopt a different approach to emissions and energy policy 
from the current administration and Congress. 
                                                                 
 34. Id. at 44,803. 
 35. Id. at 44,771. 
 36. Id. 
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6. Key legal considerations 
In its issuance of the ACE Rule, EPA seems to be walking a 
tightrope between the aggressive and novel use of CAA Section 111(d) 
encompassed in the broad-based ambitions of the CPP and not 
regulating power plant GHG emissions at all. On the one hand, the 
ACE Rule’s focus on “within the fence line” measures would seem to 
insulate it from the key legal vulnerabilities of the CPP. In fact, during 
oral arguments over challenges to the CPP, the newest member of the 
Supreme Court, then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh, expressed skepticism 
regarding the consistency of the CPP’s “beyond the fence line” 
approach with the text of the CAA.37 Judge Kavanaugh also questioned 
whether the CAA gave EPA the authority to enact such an ambitious 
and broad rule, a view likely shared by conservative members of the 
U.S. Supreme Court. The more modest approach reflected in the ACE 
Rule seems calibrated to address these concerns. 
At the same time, EPA did not choose to forgo regulating power 
plant GHG emissions altogether by either overturning its 
Endangerment Finding, which serves as the basis for much of EPA’s 
climate change rulemaking activity, or concluding that CAA Section 
111(d) does not authorize regulation of GHG emissions from existing 
power plants. Although some industry groups and policymakers have 
advocated either or both approaches, such approaches would certainly 
have been challenged in light of prior U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
and EPA rulemaking activity. In addition, abandoning GHG regulation 
altogether could have made the power industry more vulnerable to 
climate change–based common law lawsuits. In American Electric 
Power Co. v. Connecticut,38 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected such a 
lawsuit on the basis that EPA’s authority to regulate power sector GHG 
emissions displaces the right of parties to bring common law claims, 
such as nuisance. EPA’s decision to continue to regulate power sector 
GHG emissions would seem to preserve the ability of the power 
industry to assert that common law claims should be barred. 
                                                                 
 37. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43–44, West Virginia v. EPA (2016) (No. 15-
1363). 
 38. 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
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IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE ACE RULE 
The ACE Rule is likely to be the subject of substantial litigation; in 
fact, environmental activist groups and certain states have already 
announced an intention to challenge it once finalized. Comments 
recently submitted by such groups to EPA provide a clear picture of 
the key legal issues likely to arise in lawsuits challenging the ACE 
Rule once it is finalized. 39 
A. EPA’s designation of HRIs as best system of emissions reduction 
under Section 111(d) of the CAA 
Opponents of the ACE Rule are sure to assert that it does not meet 
EPA’s obligation under Section 111(d) of the CAA to identify the 
“best system of emissions reductions” of GHG’s from the power sector 
as the BSER “building blocks” designated in the CPP would have 
resulted in greater emissions reductions and are therefore superior to 
the measures identified in the ACE Rule. Furthermore, merely 
identifying various HRI technologies without establishing any 
concrete numerical or other targets that states are required to meet, or 
any substantive criteria for state plans, is not considered BSER as it 
does not constitute a “system of emissions reduction,” and certainly 
not one that is “best.”   
B. EPA’s modelling of the impact of the ACE Rule 
Opponents of the ACE Rule will no doubt question EPA’s modeling 
regarding the effectiveness of efficiency measures to meaningfully 
reduce emissions. In doing so, opponents will likely point to the 
                                                                 
 39. See, e.g., Joint Comments of Environmental and Public Health Organizations 
on the Best System of Emission Reduction and Other Issues in EPA’s Proposed 
Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Doc. No. EPA-HQ-OAR-
2017-0355 (October 31, 2018); Comments of the Attorneys General of New York, 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota (by and through its Minnesota Pollution Control Agency), New Mexico, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, and the District of Columbia, and the cities of Boulder (CO), Chicago, 
Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and South Miami (FL), and Broward County 
(FL) on the Environmental Protection Agency’s Proposed Emission Guidelines for 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Doc. No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355 (October 31, 2018) 
[hereinafter State Attorneys General Comments]. 
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“rebound effect,” which is the tendency of efficiency measures alone 
to backfire in reducing emissions because applying such measures to 
a pollution source can result in lower costs, which can lead to more use 
of the source, thereby cancelling out some or all of the emissions 
reduction that might otherwise be expected. While EPA asserts in the 
Federal Register notice accompanying the ACE Rule that it 
appropriately accounts for the “rebound effect,”40 as recently as last 
year EPA indicated that the efficiency measures included as the first 
building block in the CPP “cannot stand on its own” due to the 
“rebound effect.41 
C. Consistency of the change to the NSR program with the CAA 
Another potential target of legal challenges are the changes to the 
NSR program, which will allow fossil fuel–fired plants to continue 
their operations for longer periods of time. In addition to increases in 
carbon dioxide emissions, EPA models predict increases to other 
pollutants harmful to human health, including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen 
dioxide and mercury.42 A number of proposals in the 2000s by EPA to 
relax NSR rules were first rejected by courts and ultimately abandoned 
and opponents of the ACE Rule are likely to resurrect those challenges 
again.43 
D. The role of Chevron deference 
A key legal issue in any litigation regarding the ACE Rule will be 
the degree of deference to grant EPA’s interpretations of the CAA. As 
noted above, the doctrine of Chevron deference provides that where 
Congress has been silent or ambiguous regarding administrative 
agency authority under certain statutes, courts must defer to such 
agencies’ interpretation of those statutes. EPA will be expected to 
assert that its interpretations of the CAA should be subject to Chevron 
deference. However, in recent years, some federal judges have 
                                                                 
 40. 83 Fed. Reg. at 44,756, n.17. 
 41. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,039, n.5 (Oct. 
16, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). 
 42. 83 Fed. Reg. at 44,783–44,785. 
 43. See id. at 44,776–44,783; see also State Attorneys General Comments, supra 
note 39, at 104–126. 
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questioned the validity of Chevron and advocated limiting its 
application.44  If courts decide that the ACE Rule is not entitled to 
Chevron deference as a result of this legal trend, the relevant 
provisions of the CAA would be reviewed do novo by courts, which 
would increase the likelihood that the EPA’s interpretation of the CAA 
that undergird the ACE Rule would be rejected. 
V. ENVIRONMENTAL, BUSINESS AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
According to EPA’s own analysis, the ACE Rule will result in the 
emission of between forty-four and fifty-five million metric tons more 
CO2 from the power sector compared to a scenario where the CPP 
remains in place (an approximately three percent increase) and eleven 
and twenty-two million metric tons less CO2 compared to a no 
regulation scenario (an approximately one percent decrease).45 The 
backdrop to these numbers is the dramatic recent trend towards 
decarbonization in the power sector, which has been occurring over 
the past several years due to improvements in the economics of natural 
gas and renewables, impacts of other clean air regulations and 
initiatives by institutional investors, which has helped to place the 
power sector on track to meet the CPP’s emissions reduction goals.46 
In fact all of the scenarios reviewed by EPA in its ACE Rule regulatory 
analysis (i.e., a CPP scenario, a range of ACE Rule scenarios and a no 
regulation scenario) project that emissions from the power sector by 
2030 will meet or exceed the original emissions reduction goals set 
                                                                 
 44. Justice Brett Kavanaugh has called Chevron as “nothing more than a 
judicially orchestrated shift of power from Congress to the Executive Branch.”  
Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh, Book Reviews: Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2150 (2016). In Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, Justice Gorsuch 
wrote in a concurring opinion that Chevron “permit[s] executive bureaucracies to 
swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power.” 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 
(10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 45. 83 Fed. Reg. at 44,783–44,785. 
 46. While the CPP targeted a 32% reduction of CO2 emissions relative to 2005 
levels, the power sector has already reduced CO2 emissions by 28%. See Carbon 
dioxide emissions from the U.S. power sector have declined 28% since 2005, U.S. 
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (“EIA”) (October 29, 2018), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37392 [https://perma.cc/7BL6-
D78C]. By contrast, in 2015 the EIA estimated that in the absence of any regulation, 
CO2 emissions from the power sector would only decline by 10% by 2030 relative 
to 2005 levels. See EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 (2015). 
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forth in the CPP.47  However, due mainly to other pollutants associated 
with coal-fired power plants, EPA estimates that as compared to the 
CPP, the ACE Rule will cause an additional 470 to 1,400 premature 
deaths as well as tens of thousands of additional cases of medical 
conditions such as asthma.48 
The immediate impact of the ACE Rule on the power sector, if 
finalized, is likely to be relatively modest. While EPA estimates that 
the ACE Rule would reduce the compliance burden on the fossil fuel–
fired power sector by $400 million in comparison to the CPP, it is 
important to bear in mind that industry has been operating for several 
years on the assumption that the CPP was never likely to become 
effective law. In addition, as noted above, power companies have been 
shifting their generation portfolios away from coal due to a variety of 
factors. It appears unlikely that the ACE Rule alone will significantly 
impact this trend in the near term and initial reactions by utilities to the 
ACE Rule indicate that it is not impacting their power generation 
decisions.49 
The long-term outlook on the power sector (and related commodity 
pricing), however, is somewhat murkier. The Trump administration 
has been a strong advocate for coal and has suggested a variety of 
measures to support coal–fired power generation, including loosening 
the 2015 Power Plant NSPS with respect to new coal-fired power 
plants as well as price supports and mandates to grid operators to 
purchase power from identified coal–fired power plants. Should the 
Trump administration succeed in putting these measures into place, 
such measures combined with the ACE Rule (and particularly its NSR 
reform proposal) may slow the trend away from coal, thereby 
potentially impacting the prices of fossil fuels. To be sure, any push to 
revive coal-fired power generation is likely to be complicated by the 
                                                                 
 47. See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED EMISSION 
GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING ELECTRIC UTILITY 
GENERATING UNITS; REVISIONS TO EMISSION GUIDELINE IMPLEMENTING 
REGULATIONS; REVISIONS TO NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM  3-15 (2018) 
(showing emissions reductions by 2030 relative to 2005 ranging from 33% in a no 
regulation scenario to 36% in a CPP scenario) [hereinafter ACE RULE RIA]. 
 48. Id. at 4-32-35. 
 49. Darren Sweeney et al., Trump Power Plan Unlikely to Make Case for Coal, 
Utilities Say, S&P GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Sept. 11, 2018), 
https://platform.mi.spglobal.com/web/client?auth=inherit#news/article?id=4641260
4&cdid=A-46412604-13615 [https://perma.cc/3WFB-ADHZ]. 
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market forces discussed above as well as regulatory initiatives at the 
state level and low-carbon initiatives by institutional investors and 
other stakeholders. 
However, as noted above, the timelines of the ACE Rule extend well 
into the next decade. Accordingly, the fate of the ACE Rule will most 
likely depend on which party succeeds at the polls in upcoming 
Presidential and Congressional elections. 
While a future administration could be tempted to simply send the 
EPA to the drawing board once again, opting for a different approach 
to climate change regulation after the decade-plus long efforts to 
regulate power plant GHG emissions through rulemaking under the 
EPA’s existing authority under the CAA, policymakers might be 
tempted to revisit another approach: federal climate change legislation. 
Federal legislation seems unlikely in the polarized political climate of 
today’s Washington. However, a number of trends, including 
continued development of a patchwork of climate change regulation at 
the state level, increased high-profile adverse weather events, and 
growing voluntary adoption of climate initiatives by industry and 
investors suggest that some sort of bipartisan legislative consensus on 
climate change at the federal level may be possible down the road. 
While politically complicated, policymakers may decide that such 
efforts may ultimately be a more effective path to the regulation of 
GHG emissions from the power sector than an impermanent and 
uncertain rulemaking process. 
 
